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RECENT CASES

TORTS-INFANTS-CHILD HAS A RIGHT TO SUE FOR

Loss

OF AN IN-

JURED PARENT'S SOCIETY AND COMPANIONSHIP

Plaintiff, Christine Berger, was involved in a rear-end
automobile collision with defendant. 1 Plaintiffs, Wayne and
Christine Berger, subsequently filed a complaint on their own
behalf and sought damages for medical expenditures, loss of income and loss of consortium. 2 As next friend, Wayne Berger sought
damages for his mentally retarded daughter's loss of society, companionship, love and affection of her mother as a result of the injuries sustained by Mrs. Berger. 3 Defendant conceded the issue of
liability as to plaintiffs and sought a trial on the amount of
damages. 4 The trial court, however, granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment as to the issue of liability for the minor
daughter's loss of society and companionship. 5 Plaintiff cross- appealed the trial court's summary judgment and the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that a child may maintain a cause of action
for loss of parental society and companionship when a parent is
severely injured. 6 Berger v. Weber, -

Mich. App. -,

267 N. W.

2d 124 (1978).
1. Berger v. Weber-Mich. App. -, 267 N. W. 2d 124(1978).
2. Id.
3. Id. It was further alleged that the mentally retarded child was dependent upon her mother to
administer to her peculiar physical and psychological needs and because Mrs. Berger had allegedly
sustained both physical and psychological injuries in the accident, she could no longer continue to
administer to the peculiar needs of her retarded daughter. Id. at -, 267 N. W. 2d at 125.
4. Id. Thejury awarded Wayne and Christine Berger $142,000 upon which defendant appealed,
alleging error in thejury instructions. Id.
5. Id. The trial court ruled that there was no cause of action in Michigan for a minor child's loss
ofa parent's society and companionship. Id.
6. Id. The Michigan court rejected the contention that the child has an independent action for
loss of economic support.
Because the injured parent may recover for financial losses resulting from his or
her disability, we reject the contention that a child has an independent action for "support," at least in the economic sense. To allow a parent to recover lost wages, for
example, and to also allow a child to recover for loss of support would result in double
recovery.
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Courts have consistently refused to grant a right of action to a
child for loss of a parent's love, care, and companionship resulting
from a tortious injury to the parent.7 Although the rule has been
questioned by some commentators' and courts have confessed that
such a claim is supported by natural justice, 9 logical symmetry and
sentimental appeal, 10 courts have denied recovery based on a variety of grounds. The basic reasons for the denial of recovery are: the
absence of precedent for such an action;1I the exposure of the defendant to multiple claims for a single wrongful act;1 2 the uncertainty
and remoteness of the damages involved; 3 the child's recovery
might overlap with that of the injured parent; 1 4 the child has no
legal claim to any benefit from his parents except support and
maintenance; 15 the action would expose the defendant to exorbitant
liability; 1 6 and that creation of such a cause of action is a legislative
function. 7 , Some commentators have urged that recognition of
such a cause of action would be anomalous since most states have
refused to recognize a child's action for intentional invasion of the
family relationship stemming from the alienation of affections of a
parent.' 8 Other considerations such as increased insurance costs as
well as the danger of fabricated actions have been used against the
recognition of such a cause of action for children. 19 Prior to Berger,
Therefore the court's holding is confined to a child's independent action for loss of society and
companionship caused by tortious injury to its parent. Thus, in Berger, the court recognized a new
cause of action which has been heretofore expressly rejected by most jurisdictions. Id.
7. See Annot., 69 A. L. R. 3d 528 (1976); 56 B. U. L. REV. 722 (1976).
8. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 125 at 896 (4th ed. 1971). "It is not easy to understand and appreciate this reluctance to compensate the chilli who has been deprived of the care, companionship
and education of his mother, or for that matter his father, through the defendant's negligence. This is
surely a genuine injury, and a serious one..." Id.
9. Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D. D. C. 1952); Hoffman v. Dautel,
189 Kan. 165, 167, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962).
10. Suterv. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d. 744, 746. 120 Cal. Rptr. 110. 111 (1975).
11. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D. C. Cir. 1958); Jeune v.
Del. E. Webb Constr. Co.. 77 Ariz. 226. 227-28, 269 P.2d 723. 724 (1954): Borer v. American
Airlines Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 449, 563 P.2d 858, 864 138 Cal. Rptr.302, 308 (1977); Hankins v.

Derby, 211 N. W. 2d 581, 585-86 (Iowa 1973).
12. 19 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 563 P.2d at 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307; Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan.
165, 169, 368 P.2d 57. 60 (1962); Eschenbach v. Benjamin. 195 Minn. 378. 380. 263 N. W. 154,
155-56(1935).
13. 19 Cal. 3d at 448, 563 P.2d at 863. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307: Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61
N.J. 502,507. 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
14. Garza v. Kantor. 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025. 1028. 127 Cal. Rptr. 164. 165 (1976): Hoffman v.
Dautel, 189 Kan. at 169. 368 P.2d at 60: Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N. J. at 507. 295 A.2d at
864.
15. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co.. 262 F.2d at 472-73; Gibson v. Johnston, 144
N. E. 2d 310, 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). appeal dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 288, 141 N. E.2d 767 (1957).
16. Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.. 61 N.J. at 506, 295 A.2d at 864.
17. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co.. 262 F.2d at 473: Hill v. Sibley Memorial
Hosp., 108 F. Supp. at 741: Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, -, 348 N. Y. S.2d 696, 701
(1973).
18. See Lewis, Three Aea, Causes qf Action? 4 Study qf the Family Relationship, 20 Mo. L. REV.
107,117 (1955). But see Miller v. Monsen. 228 Minn. 400. 37 N. W. 2d 543 (1949): Wrangham v.
Tebelius, 231 N. W.2d 753 (N. D. 1975).
19. 54 MiciN. L. REv. 1023 (1956). In Blair v. Seitner Dr, Goods Co.. 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.
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only a federal court in Hawaii had recognized that a child may have
a cause of action for loss of society and companionship.2 0 However,
that ruling was reversed 2 when the Supreme Court of Hawaii later
ruled that a minor had no cause of action where injuries to the
parent did not result in death.2 2
In reaching its decision, the court in Berger took notice of the
judicial recognition of the emerging rights of children.2 3 At
common law, children lacked legal competence, were generally
considered the property of their parents and occupied a most
subjugated position. 24 Recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court have since elevated the child's status as a person,
with many of the same rights as adults. 2 5 The Court has stated that
children are persons under the Constitution, 26 and entitled to
protection for freedom of speech, 27 equal protection against racial
discrimination, 28 and due process in civil29 as well as criminal
contexts. 30 There has also been a pronounced emergence of new
W.
hut
W.
33,

724 (1915), the court found that minor children may suffer on account of an injury to a parent
that "it has never been considered that they had an action therefor." 184 Mich. at 313, 151 N.
at 727. Blair has since been overruled, but on othergrounds. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich.
101 N. W. 2d 227 (1960).
Similarly, the court in Hayrenen v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich. App. 452, 157 N. W. 2d
502 (1968), grounded its objection to a child's recovery on the lack of "statutory or prior judicial
authority at the present time ...." 9 Mich. App. at 456, 157 N. W. 2d at 503.
In deciding which statute of limitations was applicable in a wrongful death action, the Michigan
Supreme Court indicated that a minor had no right of action for injuries to his parent. Cugell v.
Sani-Wash Laundy Co., 280 Mich. 286, 289, 273 N. W. 571, 572 (1937).
20. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955). The District Court found no prior
case or statutory precedent existed in the Hawaii state courts. However, the court read previous
decisions in related areas as demonstrating that Hawaii intended to protect all legal interests of the
family. Id. at 871.
Furthermore, the court found that:
(T)he cause of action is not founded upon the degre or quantity of the loss. Rather it is
premised upon an invasion of a right. So it is that both logic and the law agree that
redress may be had for a temporary impairment as well as for the total destruction of a
right incident to the family relationship.
Id.
21. Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1957).
22. Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634 (1957). The court found no such course of action to exist at
common law. Id. See also Annot., 59 A. L. R.2d 454 (1958).
23. -Mich. App. at-,
267 N. W. 2d at 126.
24. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 17(1967).
25. "Minors as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutonal
rights". Planned Parenthood ofCent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976). "Whatever may be
their precise impact, neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone". In re
Gault, 387 U. S. at 13.
26. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S.503, 511 (1969).
27. West Virginia State Bd.ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) (right to refuse to salute
the flag); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969) (right to wear black armbands to
protest Vietnam War). But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (196$) (children's right to obtain sexually oriented materials more restricted than that ofadults).
28. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (right of black children to equal'
educational opportiunity).
29. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975) (right to notice and informal hearing in school
discipline context).
30. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.
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rights for children withiti the family itself. 3t Children are now
allowed to obtain some types of medical treatment without parental
consent, 3 2 as well as legal representation in certain legal
proceedings. 3 3 In addition, numerous cases have abolished or
limited the doctrine of parental tort immunity which barred
children's suits to recover for injuries caused by parental
negligence. 34 A child may also sue a tortfeasor for negligently
inflicted pre-natal injuries. 35 The court in Berger found that these
cases reflect a growing awareness by the judiciary that children are
persons with a variety of legal interests, including parental society
36
and companionship, which are deserving of legal protection.
In allowing the child to recover when his parent is wrongfully
injured, the court in Berger also recognized that the child suffers a
serious loss when he is deprived of a parent's love, care, guidance
and affection. 3 7 Even where recovery has been denied, most courts
have recognized that a child does suffer a realistic injury, 38 and a
valuable loss as a result of his parent's injury. 39 Furthermore, the
loss of these benefits can have a severe impact on the child's
development and personality. 40 Because every individual's
character and disposition have an impact on society, "it is of the
highest importance to the child and society that its right to receive
the benefits derived from its parents be protected."41 The court in
Berger also recognized the importance of the "family unit" 42 and
S. 1 (1967) (rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination and privilege against selfincrimination).
31.56 B, U. L. REV. at 743 (1976).
32. All but five states have statues which permit minors to consent to treatment for venereal
disease, and all states by statute permit minors to consent to treatment fbr drug abuse or dependency. See Pilpel, Minor's Right toMedical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 472-87 (1972).
33. See Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N. W. 2d 188 (1965) (in a hotly contested
divorce, a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the interests of the child).
34. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648. 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Plumley v. Klein,
388 Mich. 1, 199 N. W.2d 169 (1972): Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N. W. 2d 631 (1968);
Nuelle v. Wells. 154 N. W.2d 364 (N. D. 1967).
35. See Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N. W.2d 218 (1971) (a child has a right to
begin life with a sound mind and body).
36. -Mich. App. at-.
267 N. W.2d at 127.
37. Id.
38. 19 Cal. 3d at 453. 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
[Wle do not doubt the reality or the magnitude of the injury suffered by the plaintiffs.
We are keenly aware of the need of children for the love, affection, society and guidance of their parents: any injury which diminishes the ability of a parent to meet these
needs is plainly a family tragedy. harming allmembers of that community.
Id.
39. Hill v. Siblev Memorial Hosp.. 108 F. Supp. at 741. "When a child loses the love and companionship of a parent, it is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious." Id.
40. -Mich. App. at 267 N. W.2d at 127.
41. Miller v. Monsen. 228 Minn. 400. 403, 37 N. W.2d 543. 545 (1949). The court found that a
minor child had a cause of action against one enticing its parent from their family home and could
recover damages sustained as a result of the enticement. Id.
42. -Mich. App. at 267 N. W.2d at 128.
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the child's interest in the maintenance and benefits from the family
relationship.43
In Berger, the court found the reasons for not allowing the
child's cause of action 44 to be unpersuasive. 45 In addition, the court
considered the reasons advanced in Borer v. American Airlines Inc. 46 as
unpersuasive. 47 In first considering the lack of precedent argument,
the Berger court found the contention to misperceive the evolving
concept of the common law, and such a contention carried to its
logical extreme would result in a static body of law. 48 Other courts
have ruled that the absence of precedent should not preclude a
cause of action, 49 and that the common law should change with the
needs of society.5 0 Thus the Berger court declared that "when the
crowd is marching in the wrong direction, it is time to break rank
and strike out on our own. ,,51
The second argument which the court took issue with
concerned the uncertainty of damages and the inability of money
damages to compensate for such an intangible loss. 5 2 While it has
been suggested that the monetary value of a parent's
companionship and affection is too speculative for damages to be
assessed to compensate for the loss, 5 3 the Berger court found the task
no more difficult than the task of determining a spouse's identical
loss or the almost identical loss of a child in a wrongful death action
when a parent is killed.5 4 Once liability is established, difficulty in
determining damages should not bar recovery. 55 Moreover, it has
56
long been the role of the jury to determine these type of damages
43. Id. See also Hankins v. Derby, 211 N. W.2d at 589 (Iowa 19/3) (Mason,.J., dissenting).
44. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
45. -Mich. App. at-,267 N. W.2d at 128.
46. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302. The Supreme Court of California refused
to recognize a new cause of action for loss of consortium in a parent-child relationship. In that case,
the plaintiffs were nine children whose mother was injured when an allegedly defectively manufactured or installed lighting fixture fell from the ceiling, striking and injuring the mother. Id.
47. -Mich. App. at-,
267 N. W.2d at 128.
48. Id.
49. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962). "Novelty is not sufficient to prevent
recovery and the absence of precedent does not prove that a cause ofaction cannot be maintained."
Id. at -, 368 P.2d at 59. Seealso Hill v.Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. at 740.
50. Hoffman v.Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962).
One of the basic characteristics of the common law is that it is not static, but is endowed with vitality and a capability to grow. It never becomes permanently
crystalized but changes and adjusts from time to time to new developments in social
and economic life to meet the changing needs of a complex society.
Id.at-. 368 P.2d at 59. See also Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. at 741.
51. -Mich. App. at -. 267 N. W.2d at 128.
52. Id.
53. Russell v. SalemTransp. Co., 61 N. J. at 507, 295 A.2d at 864 (1972).
54. -Mich. App. at -. 267 N. W.2d at 128.
55. Id.
56. 19 Cal. 3d at 454. 565 P.2d at 866-67. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11 (1977). (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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which they have done successfully. 57 The California Supreme
Court in Borer argued that because the child's loss is intangible,
money damages were inadequate. 58 The court in Berger, however,
found this to be more of a comment on the inadequacy of legal
remedies in general rather than a valid reason for denying recovery
59
to a child.
The court in Borer also argued that there was a possibility of
double recovery by the child, 60 because the juries have already
compensated the child for lost economic support through an award
to the parent, or indirectly included a child's emotional loss
through an award to the parent. 6 1 In Berger, the court agreed with
the first of these arguments and declined to allow a child an action
for loss of economic support. 62 The court, however, felt that the
second argument could be circumvented through use of proper jury
instructions. 63 The holding in Berger was restricted to allow recovery
for the loss of parental6 4 society and companionship only. 65 Thus the
court felt that it had successfully closed the familiar "floodgate of
66
litigation" argument.
In dealing with the possibility of multiple lawsuits, the court in
Berger took notice of crowded trial dockets and concluded that the
child's interests in recovery outweighed the possibility of multiple
lawsuits. 67 The possibility of pyramiding claims 68 and the potential
burden of liability on the defendant 6 9 was a strong point made by
57. Miller v. Monsen. 228 Minn. at -. 37 N. W.2d at 546.
58. 19Cal. 3d441. 563 P.2d858. 138Cal. Rptr. 302. "IT]he inadequacy of monetary damages
to make whole (he loss suffered. considered in light of the social cost of paying such awards, constitutes a strong reason for refusing to recognize the asserted claim," Id.at 447. 563 P.2d at 862. 138
Cal. Rptr. at 306.
59. -Mtich. App. -. 267 N. W.2d 124. "Money cannot purchase eyesight for one who is blinded nor can it truly compensate for intangibles such as pain and suffering or the loss of life. To say
that a child cannot be fully compensated for his or her loss does not justify ignoring the loss
altogether." Id.at -, 267 N. W.2d at 128-29.
60. 19 Cal. 3d at 448. 563 P.2d at 863. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
61. Id.
62. -Mich. App. at -. 267 N. XV..2d at 129.
63. Id. The court felt that rather than having juries make blind calculations of the child's loss in
determining at award to the parent. the child's loss could be openly argued in court and the jury
could be instructed to consider the child's loss separately thus. in the court's view. eliminating the
possibility of double recovery. Id.
64 Id. (emphasis added) This Would include not only natural parents but also those who have
assumed a parental role to a child. \Vhether a person serves as a parent would have to be adjudicated
on a case by case basis. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id."The rights of a new class of tort plaintiffs should be forthrightl judged on their own
tiertits. rather than engaging in glooty speculation as to shere it will all end." Id.
67. Id.
68. Garza v. Kantor. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 1028. 127 Cal. Rptr. at 165: Hoffman v. Dautel. 189
Kan. at - 368 P.2d at 60.
69. Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.. 61 N. 1. 502. 295 A.2d 862 (1972). "If the claim iwere
allosved there would be a substantial accretion ofliability against the tort-feasor arising out of a single
d. at -. 295 A.2d at 864.
transaction (typically the negligent operation offan automobile). I"
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some courts in denying the child's action. 7 0 A possible solution
suggested was compulsory joinder of actions,7" which has been used
72
by some states in the spousal loss of consortium area.
The court in Berger also considered the contention that because
children may not recover for intentional invasion of the family
relationship,7 3 it would be anomalous to allow recovery for
negligent invasion.7 4 The Berger court noted that a child was able to
recover damages in a wrongful death action even though the action
for alienation of affections had been abolished.7 5 Furthermore, the
alienation of affections action was based upon different policy
grounds. 76 Thus the Berger court found this contention
77
unpersuasive.
Finally, the Berger court considered the argument that
"consortium" was limited to the sexual aspect of the spousal
relationship and that, therefore, a child could not recover. 78 The
court did not attempt to decide what "consortium" did or did not
include. 79 In Borer, the court found that the spousal action for loss of
consortium 80 rested in large part on the "impairment or destruction
of the sexual life of the couple" and that, therefore, no similar
element of damage existed in a child's suit for loss of consortium. 8'
70. 19Cal. 3d at 448-49, 563 P.2dat 863, 138Cal. Rptr. at 307.
71.56 B. U. L. REv. at 733 (1976).
The availability of these procedures - absolute compulsory joinder and compulsory
joinder at the defendant's option - should foreclose the argument that recognition of
the child's action would result in a burdensome multiplicity of suits. Moreover.
utilization of these procedures would unite the separate suits and permit one settlernent of all the claims, thus alleviating the overcrowding of dockets. The child's action would not require a separate trial: instead, it would be an adjunct to the parent's,
personal injury suit. There would be no increased burdens on judicial time and encrgy
other than trying the issue ofdamages sustained by the child.
Id.
72. Several states require that a consortium claim be joined for trial with the underlying injury
suit. SeeThrill v. Modern ErectingCo.. 284 Minn. 508. 518. 170 N. W.2d 865. 869(1969): General
Electric Co. v. Bush. 88 Nev. 360, 367-68, 498 P.2d 366. 371 (1972).
73. In Michigan, Mici. Costp. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2901 (1968) has abolished actions for
alienation of affections. This statutory prohibition specifically prevents a minor from recovering from
one who has induced a parent away from home. See Miller v. Kretschmer. 374 Mich. 459, 132 N.
W.2d 141 (1965). Butsee Miller v. Monsen. 228 Minn. 400, 37 N. W.2d 543 (1949).
74. -Mich. App. at -. 267 N. W.2d at 129.
75. Id.
76. Id. at -, 267 N. W.2d at 130. The Bergercourt pointed out that:
(W)hen a parent isenticed from the home, the value of parental love and companionship is open to question. The alienation of affections action is grounded on the
theory that an innocent spouse or parent has been maliciously enticed from the home
by a seductive intruder. The modern scenario is more likely to disclose a dissappointed
spouse who is as much the pursuer as the pursued.
Id. at-. 267 N.W.2d at 130. Seealso56 B. U. L. REv. at 739 (1977).
77. -Mich. App. at-.
267 N. WV.2d at 130.
78. Id
79. Id.
80. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 852 (1950),
was the first decision to recognize the wife's right to reco,'er for loss of consortium when her husband
was injured by the defendant's negligence.
81. 19 Cal. 3d at 448. 563 P.2d at 863. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307. See also Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
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Furthermore, courts8 2 have found the two relationships to be
different not only in kind, but also in degree.8 3 Consortium,
however, has been defined to encompass more than mere sexual
84
relations between spouses.
One contention not discussed in the Berger ruling, but
discussed in Borer, was the argument that denial of the child's cause
of action was in violation of the fourteenth amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 85 The court in Borer deferred to the legislature
and found that the legislature could have rationally concluded that
only upon the parent's death should intangible losses to a child
become actionable. 8 6 Other courts also have deferred to the
legislature8 7 and some have expressly stated that creation of such an
88
action should be an act of the legislature.
The courts in North Dakota have not yet considered whether a
child has an action for loss of parental society and companionship.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that a wife may sue
for the alienation of affections and loss of her husband's society,
support and protection.8 9 In addition, the court has recognized a
Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382,405,525 P.2d 669,684,115 Cal. Rptr. 765,780 (1974).
82. Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3 1025, 127 Cal. Kptr. 1of 1976).
83. Id. at 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
These relationships are not the same. The one rests in contract. . . . The other
does not. The one endures for the length of the marriage; the other, generally
speaking, is a continuing close familial relationship only during the minority of the
child at most. Love, affection, companionship and services between adults differ in
kind and not simply in degree from the same matters when they exist within the
relationship of parent and child.
Id.
84. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. at 36. 101 N. W.2d. at 228 (defining consortium as
"love, companionship. affection. societv, sexual relations. services, solace... and more") Seealso
Lippman, The Brcakdoti' ofConsortiun. 30 Coisi. L. Rev. 651. 652-53 (1930).
85. 19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309. The argument usually made is
that there is no tational basis to support a ruling that permits the children of a deceased parent to
recover the value of lost affection and companionship in a wrongful death action, but denies the
children ofa seriously disabled parent a similar cause of action. See, e.g., id.at 451. 563 P.2d at 865,
138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
86. Id.at 452-53. 563 P.2d at 866. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310. The majority in Borerdrew two distinctions between the child whose patent is killed and one N\hose parent is disabled, both of which flow
ftom the factthat in the latter case. the liv
ing Nictim retains his or her own cause of action. First,
recovery forloss of affection atd society of the deceased in a wrongful death action fulfills a deeply
felt social belief that a tortfeasor who negligently kills someone should not escape liability completely,
no to atter how unpi rodc t ive his victim. Secondly, the wrongful death action serves as the only
isieanss by w hich the family unit cats recover compensation for the loss of parental care and services in
the case of tle wrongful l eath of the parent. \Vhile the parent lix es. however, the tangible aspects of
the child's loss can be Lotspensated inthe parent's own cause of action. Seeid. at 451-52. 563 P.2d at
865-66. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10: Soler v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744. 120 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1975).
87. Pleasant x . N\Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d, at 473: Hill v. Siblev Memorial
Hosp.. 108 F. Stipp. at. 741, Hankins v.Derby. 211 N. XV. 2d at 584-85.
88. Duhan v. Milanowski. 75 Misc. 2d 1078. 348 N. Y. S.2d 696 (1973). "[Pilaintiff's proposal
to establish a child's right of action forloss of ser icesand affection of a parent is an idea whose time
has not vet arrived: and further. that when it arrives. its birth willbe better attended b% the
legislatUre than tie judiciaty as its legal ohstetrician.* Id.at -. 348 N. Y. S.2d at 703.
89. Oster v.Oster. 49 N. D. 723. 193 N \V. '316 (1923): Rot( v. Goehring. 33 N. D. 413. 157
N. \V. 294 (1916): Gessnerv. Horne. 22 N, D. 60, 132 N. \V. 431 (191 1). King v. Hanson. 13 N. D.
85, 99 N. \. 1085 (1904). Seealso44 N. D. I. RFx, 276(1968).
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child's cause of action for the alienation of his parent's affections. 90
North Dakota has also done away with parent-child tort immunity,
thus allowing a child a cause of action against his parent. 9 1 In Nuelle
v. Wells 92 the court held that except for the guest statute, 93 there was
no exception to the statutory law 94 which made a person liable for
negligent injury to another. 95

Therefore, it would seem that if a child is allowed to sue his
parents for his parent's negligence, the next step would be for
North Dakota to allow a child to sue a negligent tortfeasor for
causing injury to the child's parent. 96 However, the distinction
drawn here could be the direct nature of the injury in the first
action as opposed to the indirect injury to the child in the second
action. Furthermore, the North Dakota statute providing for tort
liability 97 is derived from and almost identical to the California
statute9 8 discussed in Borer v. American Airlines Inc. 99 which denied
the child's cause of action. Thus the question remains unanswered
as to whether North Dakota will follow California and the majority
view or whether it too will find the crowd marching in the wrong
direction, break rank, and join Michigan in its next step. 100
STEVE FARHART

90. Wrangham v. Tebellius, 231 N. W. 2d 753 (N. D. 1975).
91. Nuelle v. Wells. 154 N. W. 2d 364 (N. D. 1967).
92. Id
93. N. D. CENT. CODE. ch. 39-15 (1931). The guest statute was declared unconstitutional in
Johnson v. Hasset, 217 N. W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974).
94. "Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another byhis want of ordinary care or skill in the management -fhis property or person.
"N. D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1975).
95, 154 N. W.2d at 366.
96, -Mich. App. -. 267 N. W,2d 124.
97, See supra note 94.
98, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1978). The only difference between the two statutes is the fact
that part ofN. D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 was deleted in 1973 thereby doing away with the doctrine of
contributory negligence. See 1973 N. D. SEss. LAws ch. 78. § 33. In N. D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1973). North Dakota adopted the doctrine ofcomparative negligence. Sec 1973 N. D. SEss. IAWs I.
78. § I SerealsoWentz v. Deseth, 221 N. W.2d 101 (N. D. 1973).
99. 19 Cal. 3d 441. 563 P.2d 858, 138Cal. Rptr. 302.
100. -Mich. App. -, 267 N. W. 2d 124.

